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Abstract
Explaining the emergence and stability of cooperation has been a central challenge in biology, economics and sociology.
Unfortunately, the mechanisms known to promote it either require elaborate strategies or hold only under restrictive
conditions. Here, we report the emergence, survival, and frequent domination of cooperation in a world characterized by
selfishness and a strong temptation to defect, when individuals can accumulate wealth. In particular, we study games with
local adaptation such as the prisoner’s dilemma, to which we add heterogeneity in payoffs. In our model, agents accumulate
wealth and invest some of it in their interactions. The larger the investment, the more can potentially be gained or lost, so
that present gains affect future payoffs. We find that cooperation survives for a far wider range of parameters than without
wealth accumulation and, even more strikingly, that it often dominates defection. This is in stark contrast to the traditional
evolutionary prisoner’s dilemma in particular, in which cooperation rarely survives and almost never thrives. With the
inequality we introduce, on the contrary, cooperators do better than defectors, even without any strategic behavior or
exogenously imposed strategies. These results have important consequences for our understanding of the type of social
and economic arrangements that are optimal and efficient.
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Introduction
Explaining the emergence and stability of cooperation has been
a central challenge in biology, economics and sociology [1].
Unfortunately, the mechanisms known to promote it either require
elaborate strategies [2,3], or hold only under restrictive conditions
[4,5]. More recently, a number of new mechanisms have been
shown to facilitate cooperation: the topology of networks
determining the interactions among players [6–16], even though
their robustness has been challenged [17–19]; optional participa-
tion [20]; or reciprocity [21,22]. However, even when these
conditions are met, cooperation typically merely survives but does
not thrive.
Here, we show instead that cooperators can dominate exploiters
even without complex strategies and for a wider range of
parameters than previous models. We obtain this result by
studying heterogeneity among individuals. While this is not the
first study to emphasize the importance of diversity on coopera-
tion, we adopt a different approach in which it is neither
predetermined nor exogenous. In particular, previous publications
have assumed fixed and exogenously imposed heterogeneity in
payoffs [23], strategies [24], or the number of interaction partners
[25]. Here, on the contrary, we allow a more dynamic and
endogenous ‘rich-get-richer effect,’ and we do not impose any
strategy on the players. More precisely, we assume that people can
accumulate gains, and that this accumulated wealth affects the size
of the deals they can potentially reach, so that the rich can get
richer [13,26]. This emergent heterogeneity in which present gains
affect future ones is more realistic than the conventional game-
theoretical assumption of equal payoffs since, in the real world, the
rich typically engage in deals with larger stakes than the poor.
Our study follows the standard literature in analyzing the
problem of cooperation by means of ‘games’—simplified mathe-
matical representations of social or strategic dilemmas. In them,
people interact in a pairwise fashion with members of their local
network, and can take one of two actions: ‘cooperate’ or ‘defect’
(i.e., exploit the other). If both cooperate, they each receive R;i f
both defect, they receive P; finally, if only one defects and the
other cooperates, the exploiter receives T, whereas the ‘sucker’
receives S. The well-known prisoner’s dilemma, for example, is
defined by TwRwPwS. These interactions are repeated over
time, and individuals imitate the strategy of the best-performing
member of their interaction network (without forecasting).
To this typical setup, we added inequality by varying gains and
losses across agents in the following manner. In each interaction,
individuals invest a fraction aƒ1 of their wealth (to keep the
model simple, we assume a common a for the entire population),
and the return on this investment is then determined by the
outcome of the game. Assume for example that an individual with
wealth 100 interacts with another with wealth 2. Then, the smaller
budget (here: 2) determines the size of the deal and a the
proportion of wealth actually devoted to it, so that both are
assumed to invest 2a. This is intuitive: middle-income individuals
cannot enter into multi-million deals, and individuals do not
always invest their entire wealth into a single risky deal (hence
aƒ1).
In turn, the payoffs are logically determined by the size of the
deal. To return to our earlier numerical example, if one player
cooperates and the other decides to exploit, the cooperator
receives a gain of 2aS, whereas the defector receives 2aT. These
gains are added to the individual’s existing wealth, which in turn
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prisoner’s dilemma, a stag-hunt or a snowdrift game) is preserved,
but gains and losses are endogenous, in the sense that they are a
function of past performance. This is the main theoretical
innovation of this paper: payoffs are not exogenously defined,
but rather endogenously determined as a function of the players’
past actions.
Methods
We analyze a spatial game with only two types of behaviors:
cooperation (C) and defection (D). n2 players are randomly
assigned an initial strategy (C or D) and placed on the sites (cells) of
a two-dimensional n|n square lattice with periodic boundaries (a
torus). Time increases discretely (i.e., we use the standard parallel
update, though the results are robust to continuous updating). In
each round, every player interacts with each of its four von-
Neumann neighbors (denoted by j[J) in a pairwise fashion (self-
interactions are excluded). Thus, each individual plays four games
in each round and her score for the round is the sum of her payoffs
in each of these games. The impact of adopting the ‘Moore’
neighborhood instead will be explored below.
Player i’s payoff in her pairwise interaction with player j at time
t is defined by the matrix
p
ij
t ~a|min(wi
t,w
j
t)|
RS
TP

, ð1Þ
where pi
t denotes i’s cumulative payoff at the beginning of round t.
Note that, if we assumed that individuals i and j invest different
fractions ai and aj of their wealth, a|min(wi
t,w
j
t) would just have
to be replaced by min(aiwi
t,ajw
j
t), but this is not a relevant issue in
our model. The payoff reflects the idea that the magnitude of the
gains (or losses) two players can obtain is limited by the wealth of
the weaker player. When a rich person meets a poor one, the
stakes of the game they might play are small in absolute terms. Put
differently, a rich player cannot force a poor one into potential
debt. Finally, to avoid division by zero and the intricacies of
negative wealth (‘debt’), we assume that players have a minimal
cumulative payoff of 1 (again, this is no crucial model ingredient.
Alternatively, all payoffs could be shifted by a constant amount
towards positive values.)
At the end of each step, agents update their payoffs and switch
their strategy to the one of their most successful neighbor, but do
not switch if they were the most successful in that round. By
‘successful’, we mean here the amount of gains obtained during
that step. To ensure the robustness of our findings, we also
included a mutation mechanism by which at the end of each
round, one player is randomly chosen to switch its strategy to
defection (no change occurs if a defector is chosen) [27,28].
Unless otherwise specified, the simulations used to generate the
graphs are based on the following setup: 10,000 agents are placed
on a 100|100 torus, each simulation is run for 1,000 steps, and
the results are averaged over 100 different runs for each set of
parameters. The default set of parameters is a~1, R~1, T~2,
S~0, and P~0 (but PwS does not change our conclusions).
These values are standard in the literature on games, but we also
investigated the impact of varying S and T (see below). The
Figure 1. Evolution of cooperation over time. Snapshots of the lattice of a typical run (red denotes defectors, blue cooperators). (A) We start at
t~0 with 50% cooperators. (B) After only a few steps (t~4), the number of cooperators has dramatically decreased, and only a few cooperative
clusters survive. (C) Those who do survive, however, expand (t~50) and (D) ultimately take over the entire lattice (t~400).
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0013471.g001
Figure 2. Gini coefficient over time in a typical run. The plot
measures inequality by reporting the evolution over time of the
population’s Gini coefficient. We use the players’ cumulative wealth to
calculate the coefficient. Because of the setup in which we allow the
rich to become increasingly rich, the coefficient rapidly reaches extreme
levels, implying that wealth ends up being very unevenly distributed
among individuals, with only a few owning most of the total
accumulated wealth.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0013471.g002
Inequality and Cooperation
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have also explored extending it to larger degrees (see results
below). We start with 50% cooperators and 50% defectors
uniformly distributed in space. The updating rule is synchro-
nous—that is, all agents update their payoff and strategy
simultaneously at the end of each step. The asymptotic
proportions are determined by averaging over the last 100 rounds
of each simulation. In none of the cases is the standard deviation in
these last steps large enough to suggest any instability that would
warrant a different approach. In other words, the level of
cooperation converges to a fixed, parameter-dependent value.
Results
Extending classical spatial games such as the prisoner’s dilemma
[29] by wealth accumulation and economic inequality yields
striking results. Intuitively, we would expect the ‘rich get richer’
effect to undermine cooperation and, initially, defectors do indeed
obtain a high score, while cooperators perform poorly. This is
because defectors exploit cooperators, thereby securing an initial
level of wealth that allows them to do well. As a result, most
players imitate these successful defectors, and cooperation almost
disappears from the world (Figure 1B). However, those who do
survive are those who were initially isolated from defectors by a
cooperative network, and have thereby accumulated a substantial
cumulative wealth. They have been at the center of a cluster of
cooperators, and hence have been able to accumulate a sizeable
wealth in their first rounds. This wealth then makes them
‘competitive’ against defectors (Figure 1C–D). More precisely,
their wealth enables them to secure large gains with their peers,
but to suffer only small losses when interacting with defectors. This
is because defectors, who perform poorly in the defective
environment that follows the first rounds, have little to invest,
and hence do not pose a great threat to cooperators. Therefore,
after the initial turmoil, and as the world becomes more unequal
(Figure 2), cooperators rapidly take over the entire lattice and
defectors vanish almost completely (Figures 1D and 3).
These results are in marked contrast to the classical spatial
prisoner’s dilemma, in which defectors tend to spread and
Figure 3. Evolution of the number of cooperators over time.
Theplot showsthe evolution of the number of cooperators over a typical
run (see also Figure 1), with (blue line) and without (red line) wealth
accumulation. Initially, cooperators perform poorly. However, those
cooperators who do survive the initial rounds have accumulated
substantial amounts of wealth and are hence able to survive and spread.
Over time, the proportion of cooperators converges to 1 (but typically
does not reach it). The dashed lines represent two standard deviations.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0013471.g003
Figure 4. Asymptotic proportion of cooperators without and with wealth accumulation. The contour plot shows the average final
proportion of cooperators in the world, as a function of the payoff parameters T (horizontal axis) and S (vertical axis). (A) In a world in which payoffs
are homogenous across agents, the proportion of cooperators is low for any Tw1. (B) In an unequal environment, in which the rich can become
richer, cooperation is stable for a much larger range of payoff parameters. The top-left quadrant corresponds to the harmony game (HG); the bottom-
left (Tƒ1 and Sv0) to the stag-hunt (or ‘assurance’) game (SH); the upper-right quadrant (S§0, Tw1) to the snowdrift (or ‘chicken’) game (SD); and
the lower-right quadrant (Sv0 and Tw1) corresponds to the prisoner’s dilemma (PD) [33].
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0013471.g004
Inequality and Cooperation
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appreciate these differences. First, in an equal world (the classical
model) in which payoffs are homogenous across agents, the final
proportion of cooperators is low for a wide range of parameters—
in particular those that define the prisoner’s dilemma. That is, it is
very rare and difficult to obtain cooperation, and even more
difficult to sustain it without the rich-get-richer dynamics
considered here. In our setup, however, cooperation is stable for
a much larger range of parameters. More precisely, the asymptotic
proportion of cooperators is larger for a wide range of parameter values
(Figure 4), including in the prisoner’s dilemma and the snowdrift
(or ‘chicken’) games.
Second, cooperation survives more often in our setup. In fact,
cooperation fails to survive only very rarely and only for the
most extreme payoff parameters (Figure 5). This is in particular
contrast the conventional prisoner’s dilemma (without wealth
accumulation).
Finally, and even more strikingly, we find that cooperators
dominate defectors for a far wider range of parameters than under
the classical game rules. That is, not only can cooperation survive
more often, but it thrives and dominates far more than in an equal
world (Figure 6). Without wealth accumulation, the domination of
cooperators is rare for most parameter values—and in particular
for the notoriously hostile parameters that define the prisoner’s
Figure 5. Survival of cooperation without and with wealth accumulation. The contour plot shows the percentage of runs in which at least
1% of cooperators survive after 1000 steps, as a function of the payoff parameters T (horizontal axis) and S (vertical axis). Note that cooperation can
survive in much more hostile conditions (Tw1:5 and Sv0) when payoffs are unequal (panel B) than when they are not (panel A). In particular, for
extreme values (T close to 2 and S close to 21), cooperation never survives without wealth accumulation, but can survive with it.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0013471.g005
Figure 6. Domination of cooperation without and with wealth accumulation. The contour plot shows the percentage of runs that end with
more than 99% cooperators, as a function of the payoff parameters T (horizontal axis) and S (vertical axis). In a world in which wealth is not
accumulated (A), the range of parameters for which cooperation can take over is very limited (blue area in A). When the rich get richer (B), however,
the range of parameters is far larger (blue area in B).
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0013471.g006
Inequality and Cooperation
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however, cooperators fail to dominate defectors only for extreme
values of the prisoner’s dilemma.
We also investigated the impact of varying the proportion of
wealth that individuals invest (a). This proportion determines how
much past gains affect present benefits, i.e. the rate of wealth
accumulation. a~1, for example, means that present payoffs
depend on the full amount of past benefits. a~0:01, on the other
hand, means that only a small portion of the accumulated wealth
affects present payoffs and, correspondingly, the rich-get-richer
effect is small. We find that the larger the ‘‘rich-get-richer effect’’
(Figure 7), the more likely cooperation is to prevail. However,
there is no noteworthy increase in the level of cooperation beyond
a value of a&1. Furthermore, we tested the impact of using total,
cumulative payoffs over time instead of relying on the previous
step’s payoff only, and found our results to be robust to this
specification (Figure 8).
We also investigated the robustness of our findings to changes
in the number of individuals in the world, and found a strong
positive correlation with the likelihood that cooperation emerges
(Figure 9). That is, for any payoff parameters, adding individuals
on the lattice increases the probability that cooperation will
survive and dominate. The logic behind this result is that the
survival of cooperators during the first steps of the game is
critical. Large worlds—those with many individuals—are likely
to have at least one cluster of cooperators of sufficient size to
survive the initial turmoil. Since one such cluster is sufficient to
foster and promote the eventual spread of cooperation, a large
world also increases the chances that cooperation eventually
spreads.
Finally, we changed the degree of the players interaction
network from k~4 (von-Neumann neighborhood) to k~8
(Moore neighborhood). Not only do our results generalize to
this extended neighborhood, but they are even reinforced by it
(Figure 10). The underlying reason is the following: when the
interaction network is large, the likelihood that an initial
supercluster of cooperators emerges is low, since it requires a
large set of contiguous players with a cooperative strategy—the
likelihood of which decreases as the interaction network
increases, since a cluster of 8 surrounding cooperators is far less
likely than one of 4. However, any such cluster is also much
stronger and resistant to invasion than only of 4 players. In other
words, the player at the center of this protective cluster is able to
play cooperate over more interactions at the beginning of the
game than the player surrounded by only 4 cooperators. As a
result, the Moore neighborhood leads to the emergence of very
strong cooperative players that are able to sustain the initial
cluster and to invade the rest of the world. Of course, the
Figure 7. Final proportion of cooperators as a function of a. This
plot shows the impact of the multiplier a (see eqn. 1) on the final
average proportion of cooperators in the world, for typical parameter
values.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0013471.g007
Figure 8. Asymptotic proportion, domination, and survival of cooperators, when individuals imitate others based on cumulative
wealth. We tested the robustness of our results by using cumulative payoffs instead of the current step’s payoff as the basis of adaptation. That is,
agents here adapt to the strategy of their most successful neighbor, as measured by the total wealth they have accumulated over time, instead of the
payoff they obtained in the previous step. Panel A shows the final proportion of cooperators in the world (compare with Figure 4). Panel B shows the
percentage of runs that end with more than 99% cooperators (compare with Figure 6). Panel C shows the percentage of runs in which at least 1% of
cooperators survive after 1000 steps (compare with Figure 5). Note that the results basically agree with the ones, when individuals imitate others
based on their payoff in the previous time step, rather than their overall wealth, as is the case here (see Figures 4B, 5B and 6B).
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0013471.g008
Inequality and Cooperation
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unfortunately the probability that a protective cluster emerges
becomes vanishingly small as k increases. Hence, cooperation
then only emerges when the world becomes sufficiently large to
ensure (probabilistically at least) the initial appearance of this
cluster.
Discussion
Our results highlight that emergent heterogeneity through the
rich-get-richer effect can support the welfare of society. Some
economic inequality can dramatically and unexpectedly promote
cooperation, far beyond what would be possible without it.
However, this should not be construed as a call for higher levels of
inequality, since the marginal effect of inequality is decreasing.
Rather, it is the ability for some to build upon previous success that
has an impact on cooperation, but increasing inequality itself
might not be helpful, and could even become detrimental.
Nevertheless, this result has broad theoretical and practical
implications.
At the theoretical level, this finding adds to the existing and
growing research on the impact of diversity on cooperation
[23–25], and more generally on evolutionary games on graphs
[30]. In particular, it shows how cooperation can be reached in
highly hostile environments without any strategic behavior or
memory, and for a wide range of parameters and modeling
choices. It also points to important future avenues for research that
could be explored. For example, the amount of wealth invested in
each round could be a parameter determined evolutionarily and
specific to each individual. It could also be conditional upon the
opponent’s strategy: small investments would be made against
probable defectors, whereas large ones would be reserved for
cooperators. In turn, this might create incentives to defect at the
highest level, when the stakes have become large. Another
extension would be to allow voluntary contributions across
individuals. Donations by the rich to their neighbors (or perhaps
strategically to specific key individuals or areas of the world) could
help foster more cooperation faster by ensuring the survival of a
protective group around them. In this sense, inequality is not the
key to cooperation. Rather, the ability of a few to become richer
and to reward those who cooperate would be a powerful
mechanism to prevent the spread of defection. Finally, more work
is needed on including more complex strategies into the present
framework. How, for example, does tit-for-tat perform in this
context? Are there long-term strategies that would first establish a
reputation for cooperation, and then use their dominating position
to exploit others? In other words, is the high level of cooperation
obtained in our framework susceptible to exploitation by more
complex and long-term strategies?
At a practical level, our result goes against our intuition that
inequality and conflict (e.g., civil war or class tensions) are
positively correlated. However, at least for a moderate inequality,
Figure 9. Cooperation as a function of the number of
individuals. Asymptotic proportion of cooperators as a function of
the number of individuals. A larger number of individuals increases the
likelihood that an initial supercritical cluster of cooperators will survive,
and hence that at least one cooperator is protected sufficiently long to
accumulate enough wealth to outcompete defectors. Hence, for any
given set of parameters, a large number of individuals increases the
probability with which cooperation will prevail.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0013471.g009
Figure 10. Asymptotic proportion, domination, and survival of cooperators with wealth accumulation under the Moore
neighborhood. The contour plots shows three different statistics as a function of the payoff parameters T (horizontal axis) and S (vertical axis),
when the players’ interaction network is of degree k~8 (‘Moore’ neighborhood). Panel A shows the final proportion of cooperators in the world
(compare with Figure 4). Panel B shows the percentage of runs that end with more than 99% cooperators (compare with Figure 6). Panel C shows the
percentage of runs in which at least 1% of cooperators survive after 1000 steps (compare with Figure 5). We note in particular that the results we
obtained with the von-Neumann neighborhood hold under the Moore neighborhood, and even that the performance of cooperators is often
improved as a result.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0013471.g010
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economic data on civil wars [31] or micro-behavioral data from
experiments [32] is used. The US, for example, despite its high
economic inequality, is relatively exempt from class conflicts.
Moreover, the recent financial crisis has raised fundamental
questions regarding appropriate incentive structures and income
distributions. In particular, the extreme incomes in the financial
sector have caused much debate and concern. While we do not
pretend that our study can offer practical recommendation
regarding this issue, we note that the ability to accumulate wealth
is key to the success of cooperation in our model. However, this
does not mean that the extreme inequality observed between Wall
Street and ‘‘Main Street’’ is desirable or even beneficial at all. It
might well be that, combined with other factors, growing
inequality leads to more conflict rather than cooperation. In
addition, while the spread of incomes could in principle be
beneficial if it resulted from cooperative behavior (since it would
then promote the spreading of cooperation by imitation), it is likely
to promote a temporary spreading of defection if it is based on
exploitation. Hence, we wish to warn against applying our findings
too literally for policy purposes before additional work on more
complex strategies has been conducted.
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